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We present a fractional model to clarify the dynamical evolution of how and under what
circumstances—in a multi-agent economic area—newly founded ventures prolong their existence
throughout the market. Since the increase in the number of newly-established firms in a market
may generally lead to the reduction of the market share of players in the contest, after a while some
may be faded out in the market. In this regard, considering a long term evolution, all firms are
exposed to be eliminated and to give up their market share. That is why managers have the concern
of attracting more customers to satisfy at least a minimum market share, and ideally prolong their
firm’s lifetime. On the other side, due to the establishment of more newly founded ventures in a
certain industry, it is vital to be flexible and run new strategies. The triggered strategies not only
must be on time but also must be led to lengthening the additional survival time. In the present
study, it is shown that the existence of memory or lack of memory in the evolution may not be
the case, but also having a strategy plays a significant role in survival. Hence, in spite of expo-
sure to the risk of missing market share, the recalling of the past offered services and products of
the weaker firm–compared with the whole market–may prolong the time-length of surviving in the
market. In this regard, managers corresponding to the weaker firm will be able to quantitatively
make decisions toward two main concepts, firstly the strategical usage of their firms’ reputation and
secondly, launching new features and services. The aim behind this optimization is to delay the
time of reaching a minimum market share.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
Considering scarce resources, two growing economic
sectors in a selfish interaction [1] contribute to a com-
petition of gaining the possible maximum market share
and customers. Throughout a certain real-world network
of competing agents, in spite of cumulative growth [2–5],
there may exist some frictions and drivers which affect
the growth [6–9]. Following this train of thought, there
exist internal and external dynamics which create cost
of growth. Accordingly, the states of failure to possess
a definite market share, and, ever-growing market share,
or even a trade-off between further growth or failure in a
temporal behavior will emerge [8]. Considering the mem-
ory of systems as a decaying factor against sudden alter-
ations [7, 10–12], besides with probable strategies [13]
as a temporal game-changer, in this study, we apply the
memory created by an individual firm–in statue quo–in
the customers’ viewpoint or launching new strategies in
the firms as an advantage to compete against the whole
market.
Our results will build a bridge connecting a rivalry of
possessing market share and fractional calculus.
We will further discuss on;
I. the temporal properties of this multi-agent contest;
II. the memory effects of one firm on the evolution of
the whole system;
III. by changing the strategy, the extent which our in-
dividual firm can sustain in the temporal contest to pos-
sess at least a minimum ad hoc market share for a longer
time;
V. the phase spaces of α, ∆τ , γ.
The notation α is a tunable memory factor which de-
termines the state of “how much the memory is stimu-
lated in the weaker firm customers’ point of view”. Also,
∆τ denotes the added lifetime after launching the strat-
egy. 0 < γ < 1 refers to the relative growth rate of the
market share of our individual firm in respect to the rel-
ative growth rate of the market share of the other side of
the competition (the whole market except our individual
firm). Further, we will reveal the critical time, which the
whole potential market is occupied by the competitors
and achieving more market share for one firm, yields to
giving up the market share for another firm in the con-
test. Accordingly, a zero-sum gain [14, 15] will emerge.
In the present study, we introduce a simple dynamical
model to compare the behavior of a multi-agent compet-
ing market containing two sides: our individual firm on
one side, and the whole market except the so-called in-
dividual firm, on the other side (see Fig. 1). In order to
trace the patterns of dynamical growth of such contest,
we suggest a master equation which predicts the future
payoff of the mentioned contest. After a specific time,
the counter-side market with higher relative growth rate,
will occupy the whole market and maintain their grow-
ing market share influenced by advertisements, financial
investments [14, 15], hub-connections and united com-
petitors [13] and etc. On the other side of the rivalry,
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FIG. 1: Schematic diagram representing the dynamical growth and decay of market share of newly founded
firms with the relative growth rate 0 < γ < 1. (a) At the first stage, the market share of our individual firm is supposed
to be small and equal to the market share of the other side of the competition. (b) At the second stage, the conflict starts so
that the market share of one firm causes to give up the market share for another firm from the other side of the contest. (c)
Finally, when newer agents locate in the territory of others, an ever-growing market share of the bigger part of the competition
is established and a market failure occurs for our individual firm.
the one with lower relative growth rate (our individual
firm with γ < 1) is vulnerable to its market share ex-
tinction. Further, by taking into account the memory
effects [7, 10, 11] on the growth evolution of the weaker
firm, it is able to rise the time interval, ∆τ , of maintain-
ing its minimum market share.
In the demand for demonstrating the competitors’ be-
havior, some scholars considered restricted areas which
are exposed to overcrowding [16]. In this context, over
time the systems increasingly grow [6–8, 17]. As soon as
the accessible area reduces, newer agents may locate in
the territory of others, or their territories squeeze. Due
to lack of resources–the density of locating in the spatial
area around agents–the involving agents are eliminated.
This phenomenon will be amplified when the space of the
contest reduces. Indeed, after a critical time the systems
are vulnerable to some effects against growth, say lack of
space in a rivalry and squeezed territories [16] or cost of
growth [8], or agents extinction [18].
Nevertheless, in a limited space, the process of squeezing
continues to the extent that a saturation regime [16], or
characteristic time [6, 7, 19] emerges. Passing the afore-
mentioned time-stamp, the duopoly contest encounter
with a zero-sum game, that is, customers as scarce re-
sources are distributed among the firms and it may cause
some advertising [19, 20] and competition costs. The
more scarcity of the customers, the higher the possibility
of the zero-sum game.
When it comes to the role of strategy in a contest,
it stems from some different internal and external as-
pects [21, 22]. As proof of this concept, the underdogs
may be united–in a cooperative process–to overcome the
stronger side [13]. In addition, for the sake of achiev-
ing a winning position in the market share, marketing
strategies may be changed by the managers in some time-
stamps. In this perspective, the firms upon their ability
to invest and their internal and environmental situations
apply defensive or offensive marketing strategies to boost
their market share [23–26]. Nevertheless, the background
of any economic firm in the market and the history of
interactions with the customers and recalling it to cus-
tomers and also previous potential consumers [27] may
be an indication of memory.
For now, motivated by the mentioned references,
throughout this study, we will further investigate the in-
fluence of memory existence and discuss its possible pay-
offs. At the heart of this approach, it should be highly
emphasized that exploring a new strategy and also other
striking actions take time to propagate in society and this
time-lag must be considered [28].
After the above overview of memory and strategy, it is
worthy to shed light upon possible applications of our
proposed model in the industries and lay beyond the
reach of theoretical aspects, namely competitive finan-
cial interactions [13, 29], social marketing events [30, 31],
sales promotion which may be applied in a saturated
market [32], and the new phenomenon so-called crowd-
funding and financing state-of-the-art technologies [33].
As well, the proposed idea is not only limited to eco-
nomics but also extended to other fields of study involv-
ing an analogous model.
In the following, section II deals with introducing the
master equation with integer order and analyzing its dy-
namic behavior. In section III, the differential equation
associated with the weaker firm–the one with lower rela-
tive growth rate–is incorporated into the concept of mem-
ory by applying Caputo approach. To optimize the mem-
ory effects, a strategy will be suggested in section IV, and
its quality will be checked in section V. In section VI, the
conclusions and future directions are taken.
II. DEFINITIONS AND METHODOLOGY
Let us denote the two new companies’ shares of a mar-
ket at time t as I1(t) and I2(t). We consider S(t) ≥ 0
as a measure of the size of the rest of the market (the
number of potential customers) at time t. We define a
3constant coefficient γ reflecting the relative growth rates
of the market share.
Since the size of the whole market is assumed to be
constant, the summation over the numbers of customers
of the two sides, I1(t), I2(t) and the number of potential
customers S(t) are not independent, so we consider the
normalized form satisfying:
1 = S(t) + I1(t) + I2(t)− (I1(t) ∩ I2(t)). (1)
By defining the potential customers might convert to
each of the two companies’ customers through time, the
customers of the two companies could be exchanged. Due
to all the above assumptions, we define the dynamical be-
havior of the potential customers S(t) with the following
master equation,
dS
dt
= −(I1 + γI2)S. (2)
Since the potential customers, S, might choose one or
both of the two firms, the growth of I1 and I2 leads to
the reduction of S.
The negative sign shows that any growth in the values
of I1 or I2 reduces the value of S. The conversion rate
of the potential customers to the customers of the two
companies depends on their growth rate and the number
of potential customers. On the other hand, the growth
of our individual firm, the side I2, reduces the growth of
the other side, I1, and vice versa. Let’s assume that the
growth rate of side 1 is higher than side 2 when 0 < γ <
1. Therefore, one can formulate the dynamics of each
company as:
dI1
dt
= (1− γ)I1I2 + I1S, (3)
dI2
dt
= (γ − 1)I1I2 + γI2S, (4)
Under the condition of γ = 1, the two dynamical equa-
tions turn into two equal coupled differential equations.
For the same initial values of I1 and I2, the two compa-
nies will grow symmetrically as long as half of the market
is occupied.
In Fig.2, the dynamical of growth and failure of two
sides of simultaneously founded ventures I1(0) = 0.1 =
I2(0) = 0.1 with the relative growth rate γ = 0.995
show the emerging pattern of the two companies and
their competitions to earn a greater share of the market.
I2(t) reaches a maximum value at a critical time tc where
I1(tc)+ I2(tc) ≃ 1 and S(tc) ≃ 0. In the case of memory-
less, Fig. 2(a), the competition between the two compa-
nies begins at tc. At this time, companies on the other
side, side 1, start growing faster than our company, side
2, and obtains a greater part of the share market. How-
ever, our company follows a decreasing trend and loses
its share of the market. Interestingly, a small difference
between the growth rate coefficients of the companies
causes two totally diverse destinies for the two start-ups.
The development of the company with a higher growth
rate saturates at a high value while the other company
ends up with a total loss. That is, the more powerful
the company will monopolize the market. It shows that
the relative growth rate plays a significant role in the
success and failure of ventures so that relatively smaller
businesses have no chance to survive under competition
with the bigger ones.
All the above discussion are based on the defined set
of dynamical equations 2 to 4. Further in Sec. V, we
will discuss on the future states of the temporal contest
while the relative growth rate γ changes from 0 through
1. The main question is that under which condition the
newly founded enterprise has a chance to survive? Is
there any modification for the master equation to indicate
a strategy to raise the chance of success of the weaker
competitor?
In order to address this question, we consider the effect
of memory in the growth pattern of the weaker company
in the market.
III. FRACTIONAL CALCULUS AND MEMORY
A market as a system which includes intelligent ele-
ments is affected by memory. Start-up experience pro-
vides tacit knowledge of organizing routines (for exam-
ple, routines for coordinating the activity of organization
members) and skills (for instance, a choice of alliance
partners) that have already been learned from their prior
activities. Thus, customers may interfere with their pre-
vious experiences whereby the process of decision mak-
ing is influenced by recalling past events. Therefore, the
positive or negative experiences of the market caused by
the products or services of the companies could influence
the trends of the market. Hence, it suggests us to con-
sider the effect of memory in the evolution of the weaker
company (I2); e.g. the way the customers select their
vendors [34].
However, the proposed model 2-4 described by in-
teger order derivatives cannot perfectly describe non-
Markovian processes (processes with memory) [10, 35],
due to this fact that such derivatives are determined
by only a very small neighborhood around each point
of time. To overcome this shortcoming, we incorporate
the concept of fractional calculus into the system as a
kernel of the differential operator–that is, substituting a
fractional order derivative. Indeed, it is shown that frac-
tional derivatives can appropriately represent the effects
of power-law memory [36]. As a result, we formulate the
memory effects and intellectual behaviors by an integral
equation with a time-dependent kernel κ(t−t′) [10]. This
enables us to take the effect of previous time steps into
account:
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FIG. 2: The evolution of S(t), I1(t) and I2(t) with the relative growth rate γ = 0.995 with the initial values are S(0) = 0.8,
I1(0) = I2(0) = 0.1. (a) The numerical solution of a Markov process based on Eq.2, Eq.3 and Eq.4. (b) The numerical solution
of a Non-Markov process based on Eq.9, Eq.10 and Eq.11 with α = 0.5.
dI2
dt
=
∫ t
t0
κ(t− t′)Hdt′, (5)
where
H = ((γ − 1)I1(t
′)I2(t
′)) + γI2(t
′)S(t′), (6)
and we set the kernel as:
κ(t− t′) =
1
Γ(α− 1)(t− t′)α−2
, (7)
where 0 < α 6 1 and Γ denotes the Gamma function.
There are different types of fractional differential opera-
tors that are suggested by Riemann, Liouville, Grunwald,
Letnikov, Sonine, Marchaud, Weyl, Riesz, Caputo, Fab-
rizio, Atangana and other scientists [35–39]. But, in this
paper, we consider the Caputo fractional time derivative
of order α which can describe physical meanings of real-
world phenomena [35]:
c
t0
Dαt y(t) =
1
Γ(α − 1)
∫ t
t0
y′(τ)dτ
(t− t0)
α . (8)
A lower degree of the fractional derivative α indicates
a “stronger” (long-lasting) memory of customers of the
weaker company, I2. Hence, the dynamical equation of
I2 will follow a fractional differential while the two other
dynamical equations 2 and 3 will remain unchanged:
dS
dt
= −(I1 + γI2)S, (9)
dI1
dt
= (1− γ)I1I2 + I1S, (10)
c
t0
Dαt I2(t) = (γ − 1)I1I2 + γI2S. (11)
Such incommensurate fractional differential equations
can be written as:
c
t0
Dat y(t) = f(t,y(t)). (12)
The vectors y = (y1, y2, y3) and f = (f1, f2, f3) are
corresponding to (S, I1, I2) and their function of differ-
entials, respectively, and a = (α1, α2, α3) denotes the or-
ders of the differential equations such that α1 = α2 = 1.
Notice that the system 9-11 is a generalized form of the
system 2-4. Therefore, the solution of the latter system is
a particular solution of the former one, when α3 = 1. The
numerical solution of such equations comes from the dis-
cretion of an equivalent Volterra integral equation which
is extensively presented in [7, 40, 41]:
yin = y
i
0 + h
αiΣn−1
k=0b
i
n−k−1f
i
k. (13)
In the numerical solution, the time is discretized as
T = t0, . . . , tn where tn = hn and h is the step size. The
recursive Eq.13 gives the value of yi at time n based on
the initial states yi0 and the solutions of the Eq.12 at the
prior time steps functions f i
k
with weight bi
n−k−1. The
weight coefficient is given by:
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FIG. 3: A comparison of the market share of our individual firm I2(t) with the relative growth rate γ = 0.995 and initial value
I2(0) = 0.01 for three cases, without memory, with memory, and including memory and strategy. The non-fractional value of
α = 1 guarantees the absence of memory effect in the growth process of the individual company I2 (solid black line). The blue
dashed line indicates the growth of I2(t) with the memory factor α = 0.5. The red dashed and dotted line corresponds to the
growth process of the company with a new memory which is started at the peak of the memory process with α = 0.5. The
interval ∆τ denotes the added lifetime for a predefined minimum market share after launching the strategy.
bin−k−1 =
(n− 1− k)αi − (n− k)αi
Γ(αi + 1)
. (14)
For simplicity, we assume that the memory of Eq.(11)
is constant through time. Thus, by considering α = 0.5,
as it is illustrated in Fig.2, the emerging firms start de-
veloping with almost similar rate and an equal number of
potential customers converting to each of the customers
of the two businesses’ sides by considering the effect of
memory. Interestingly, the influential memory affects the
contest before the time-stamp tc, when the total mar-
ket is divided into the shares of the two companies. In
fact, it reduces the negative slope of the curve and slows
down the loss rate of the weaker company, and reduces
the growth rate of the more powerful side of the market.
Nevertheless, it is not capable to alter the final destiny of
the weaker company. That is, the benefits of experience
that permit survival may not be sufficient to generate re-
markable results. Therefore, after a comparatively longer
time, the weaker company inevitably loses its whole mar-
ket share and the more powerful side of the competition
earns the whole market.
IV. STRATEGY FOR OPTIMIZING THE
MEMORY EFFECT
“Elephants can remember, but we are human be-
ings and mercifully human beings can forget.”–Agatha
Christie. Managers of the newly founded firms usually
try to overcome a suffering liability of newness with dif-
ferent strategies. An idea that may strike the mind would
be optimizing the behavior of the company by considering
a dynamical memory that varies through time or renew-
ing the memory at a particular moment. This strategy
may lead the growth curve to the highest level of curves
based on different memory stages. Initiating the memory
from different spots of the functional history timeline of
the company, and drawing the corresponding curves en-
ables us to compare the growth patterns depending on
the memory start point. Such selective reminding could
be considered as an approach to maximize the efficiency
of newly founded ventures and raise their chance to sur-
vive in the market.
Fig.3 illustrates a comparison of the behavior of the
system including memory and strategy (red dashed and
dotted line), only memory (blue dashed line), without
memory (black solid line), which lead to different growth
dynamical curves. The black diagram shows the evo-
lution of I2(t) with the relative growth rate γ = 0.995
with the initial value I2(0) = 0.01 and α = 1. The non-
fractional value of α does not guarantee long-standing
survival time, due to the absence of the memory ef-
fects in the growth process of the company 2. The blue
curve indicates the growth of I2(t) with a similar rel-
ative growth rate, initial values, and with the memory
factor α = 0.5. In this case, the market share propor-
tion of the memory-less process lower than the process
with memory, however, it achieves a local success after
the peak time-stamp (or at the conflict time-stamp). The
red curve corresponds to the growth process of the com-
pany with a new memory starting from the peak of the
memory process. In fact, to optimize the efficiency of
a company with a lower growth rate, it must start by
recalling the past until the peak point is achieved and
6the past experiences must be forgotten, and the process
be continued with a new memory starting from the last
peak. To predict such critical points in the real-world
and provoke managers to start the strategy, the early-
warning signs [42] of peaks, in a plausible way, can warn
an approaching threshold. We can call this strategy as a
“selective recalling-forgetting strategy” which may be an
indicative of some well-known intelligent reactions in the
context of business or other possible aspects. Further-
more, in spite of the maximum value of I2, examining this
strategy for two other moments are interesting; firstly, at
the inflection of the curve S, when the customers’ be-
haviors are changing, and secondly, at the intersection of
I1 and I2, when the market is saturated and the market
shares of both sides of the contest are equal.
V. VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION
The proposed system can be validated by a well-known
biological model with a similar concept; in fact, equations
3 and 4 are analogous to Lotka-Volterra model [43] which
states that, in the competition among two species (an
individual firm and the whole market) that use the same
scarce resource (say customers), the superior competitor
(whole competitors in the market) will at last overcome
the other whereby the inferior competitor (an individual
firm) will suffer a decline in population (market share)
overtime.
In this section, in order to compare the total num-
ber of achieved customers of the weaker company, I2, for
three different cases–that is, the model without memory
(NMI2), with memory (MI2), and with memory and
strategy (SMI2), we suggest using cumulative market
share through the time. In addition, to clarify the effec-
tiveness of the proposed model for various relative growth
rates, we provide heatmaps of some proportions of cu-
mulative market share for various competition ranges,
0 < γ < 1, versus time. We also denote cumulative
function by “
∫
”, and use the notation C =
∫
SMI2∫
MI2
in
order to show a proportion of the cumulative market
share of I2 including strategy and memory to cumula-
tive market share of I2 with memory. Let’s suppose the
model for initial conditions S(0) = 0.98, I1(0) = 0.01,
and I2(0) = 0.01 with the fractional order α = 0.5, to
the time-stamp 1000.
Fig. 4 shows the cumulative market share of the com-
pany I2 for three aforementioned cases with the relative
growth rate γ = 0.995. We can easily see the evolution
process involving the strategy (red dashed line) performs
better than two other cases, as well the memory influ-
ences the system (blue solid line) after a time-stamp near
to 500. It confirms that, for such a big γ, it is necessary
to use strategy because the impact of using strategy and
memory is more than the effects of exclusive memory.
Thus, it can be concluded when the competition between
two firms is tight (e.g. for γ = 0.995), it is plausible to
introduce a selective recalling-forgetting strategy.
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FIG. 4: A comparison of cumulative market shares of I2 for
three different cases; involving memory and strategy, includ-
ing memory, and without memory, when γ = 0.995.
γ
FIG. 5: (color online) Proportions of cumulative market
shares of I2, for the system including memory and strategy to
the system with memory, in a range of relative growth rates
0 < γ < 1 through the time-stamp 1000.
Fig. 5 illustrates the proportion of the cumulative mar-
ket shares of I2 with strategy and memory to cumulative
market shares of I2 with memory. One can find out for
the range of 0.6 < γ < 0.7 and γ ≃ 1 (when the contest of
two sides is so close) using a selective recalling-forgetting
strategy is highly recommended.
Considering a predefined minimum market share, the
Fig. 6 predicts the effect of triggering the new strategy
on the lengthening the additional survival time (∆τ) of
the weaker side (our individual firm). When it comes to
a lower ratio of relative growth (γ → 0), the managers
may be indifferent toward running the strategy. Because,
when γ → 0, it results in too small additional survival
time (∆τ → 0). For larger γ, managers can provide an
trade-off analysis [19] to evaluate the probable profitabil-
ity.
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FIG. 6: Predicting the effect of triggering the new strategy on
the lengthening the additional survival time, ∆τ (see Fig. 3),
of the weaker side (our individual firm) for different rates of
competitions, γ.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE
DIRECTIONS
In this paper, by incorporating the concept of frac-
tional calculus, we have introduced a model to interfere
the existence of memory and running a strategy to study
the process of the prolong life cycle of an individual firm.
The model has been proposed in the two distinctive pro-
cesses, the memory-less case, and the memory case, then
we have determined a novel strategy to help the survival
of the individual firm.
In the memory-less process, in which the model was de-
scribed by integer orders, both sides reached a maximum
value when the conflict began. After this time, the num-
ber of clients of the market was diverging exponentially so
that the more powerful side, even for the relative growth
rate γ ≃ 1, would be dominant the whole share market.
Thus, it was shown that the individual firm has no chance
to survive under competition with the whole market on
the bigger side. However, there are some factors in real
intelligent interactions which deteriorate such intensive
divergence dynamic. In this regard, we have considered
addressing this issue by imposing memory into the model
and so the fractional Caputo derivative as an appropriate
candidate for representing memory effects of an individ-
ual firm has been used.
It is illustrated that to some time lack of memory leads to
higher achievements, and on the other hand, after some
time memory existence leads to more sustainability of
the firm. In this regard, when the firm is decaying (and
also) growing, the memory will have a slowing down ef-
fect on the processes—a conservative action. However,
one deterministic criterion is having a strategy to trigger
on time. This phenomenon makes the firm prolong its
existence in the market.
In the “selective recalling-forgetting strategy,” we have
presented a novel strategy to maximize the efficiency of
an individual weaker venture (relative to the whole mar-
ket) by recalling the past until the peak point is achieved
and the past experiences must be forgotten, and the pro-
cess is continued with a new memory starting from the
last peak. Here, we have utilized the same memory, that
is, the same fractional derivative order, for both start-
ing points, the initial time and the peak. Nonetheless,
for further interpretation, we can exploit the selective
recalling-forgetting strategy with variable fractional or-
der α(t) for a different position.
For the future investigation, it would be interesting to
expand the meaning of growth rates and the concept of
memory (or the fractional derivative order) of the pro-
posed model in the business context. Here, we have
suggested that the relative growth rate coefficients can
play the role of trade-off effects between value and cost
of individual customers [19] and it is plausible that the
memory [7, 10, 11] represents the characteristics of the
value-cost trade-off and provides the customers to satisfy
their utility [1]. Furthermore, more realistic modelings
can be studied through networks so that it encourages
us to extend this model into complex models represent-
ing the competitions of more start-ups with various initial
times on structured networks. This is a direction we plan
to explore in the future.
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